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Abstract 
This article analyzes the Central Bank’s endogenous and nonlinear credibility, under shocks and inflation targeting 
regime. Monetary policy regimes are compared, which are different in terms of endogenous credibility levels and their 
nonlinear sensibility to the observed economic deviations. It shows that the higher the credibility level, the lower its 
sensibility to the observed deviations and, as a consequence, the higher the flexibility power for the central bank to 
stimulate the economy without expressive unstable results. This proposition is verified through a stochastic autoregressive 
dynamic model and a small numeric simulation.      
 
 
© 2012 Published by Elsevier Ltd. Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility of the 
Organising Committee of ICOAE 2012 
 
Keywords: Central Bank; Credibility; Inflation Target. 
 
Available online at www.sciencedirect.com
 2 ublished by Elsevier Ltd. Selection and/or pe r-review under esponsibil ty of the
r ising o it ee of ICOAE 2012 Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.
Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.
287 Ricardo Ramalhete Moreira /  Procedia Economics and Finance  1 ( 2012 )  286 – 295 
 
1. Introduction 
The Central Bank’s credibility is an important feature in the implementation of monetary policy strategies. 
The ability a Central Bank has in order to control inflation dynamics, with lower social costs through the time, 
depends basically on its power in managing public’s inflationary expectations. The higher the Central Bank’s 
credibility level, the lower the expected inflation rate sensibility to the observed inflation deviations; and the 
higher the weight of the announced inflation target in the public’s expectations. It gives power to the Central 
Bank to implement counter-cyclical monetary policies with lower unstable results for the economy. 
Thus, modeling and estimating the Central Bank’s credibility dynamics is one of the main topics in the 
monetary policy research, because it identifies the ways by which monetary authorities can improve its 
credibility gains (and losses) and the effects of it on the economic and policy dynamics.  
In line with Argov et al. (2007), this work implements a small-scale structural macro model that does not 
present explicit microfoundations, but resembles New-Keynesian models, such as in Ball (1999), Svensson 
(1997) and Clarida, Galí & Gertler (1999), among others, thereby becoming useful in analyzing monetary 
policy implementation and dynamic macro responses from different kinds of shocks, specifically the interest 
rate shocks in this paper. The key difference between the current model and standard New-Keynesian models 
is in the Central Bank’s endogenous and nonlinear credibility, such as in Lalonde (2005), which will be 
proposed. 
As it will be shown by the results of the numeric simulations, interest rate shocks cause lower output 
variability when the credibility dynamics is conceived as an endogenous and nonlinear process, in comparison 
with the results under constant or exogenous credibility degrees. Moreover, the study verifies that the initial 
credibility level is an important factor in determining the relevant variables’ dynamics. That is, the higher the 
Central Bank’s initial credibility level, the lower the output variability as a consequence of shocks, even if the 
credibility dynamics is modeled as an endogenous and nonlinear variable. This result may explain why some 
Central Banks are faced by higher economic instability through the time, in relation to others, even when the 
Central Banks sample is under similar monetary policy regimes and economic shocks. So, in Central Bank’s 
performance the history and the credibility gains process matter. 
2. Theoretical approach: the credibility versus flexibility dilemma 
Taking the real interest rate as the main policy instrument, the central bank’s credibility is associated with 
the public’s perception of a desirable and coherent direction and velocity of the instrument rate path in the 
face of the central bank’s target. In this case, two things are essential while the economic agents are making 
their evaluation about the central bank and about its monetary policy credibility: the policy target and the 
observed shifts in the policy instrument, as it is the relation between these two variables that determines the 
credibility degree and the effectiveness of the monetary policyb.  
A useful estimator in evaluating monetary policy would be the real interest rate trajectory in relation to the 
natural interest rate. However, it is generally accepted the public’s and the central bank’s uncertainty on the 
natural interest rate level (Galí & Gertler, 2007), so that the monetary policy efficiency and credibility should 
 
 
b This concept of credibility is in the same way followed by Argov et al. (2007), among others, that is, credibility as the public’s 
assessment of the central bank’s ability to achieve the target. 
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be estimated through other indicators, such as inflation deviations and output gaps around their target and 
normal levels. Hence, if the public identifies deviations of the inflation rate from the inflation target and of the 
output level around the potential output level, there are signals in the sense that the real interest rate path 
diverges in relation to the natural rate trend. Obviously, it is assumed that the potential output is an observable 
variable or that it can be estimated by statistical filters, such as the Hodrick-Prescott filter, commonly applied 
in the empirical studies. 
In a monetary policy regime in which inflation control is the main (and the announced) central bank’s 
objective, the public evaluates the bank’s commitment and reputation by means of an analysis of the effects of 
interest rate shifts on the observed output levels, inflation rates, and on the expected inflation rates. Interest 
rate shifts that demonstrate to be inadequate with regard to their direction and/or velocity, in the face of the 
inflation control objective and the structural model, are also evaluated as wrong shifts by the public, and 
thereby decreasing the central bank’ reputation (Sicsú, 2001). And under lower reputation, the central bank 
implements a monetary policy without or with lower credibility, as a consequence of the observed policy 
errors in the past periods. 
What is the main problem of a policy with lower or without credibility? Under lack of credibility, the 
agents’ expectations do not converge to the central bank’s goal or announcement. In such a case, there is a 
kind of a conflict between the central bank and the public, given that the interest rate adjustments do not 
achieve desirable control of the public’s expectations, and so making the target much more expensive to be 
reached (Ball, 2002). Specifically in the case of the monetary policy, the lower the credibility, the higher the 
expected inflation, and thereby the higher the output and employment sacrifice ratio if the central bank is 
looking for a disinflation (Clarida, Galí & Gertler, 1999). In other words, lower credibility degrees are 
followed by an expected inflation that is more sensible to the past inflation deviations and less sensible to the 
central bank’s announcements. In such a case, the inflation control has to be made by raising strongly real 
interest rate and by pushing down the production levels, as a consequence of the inconsistence between the 
public’s forecasts and the central bank’s intentions.  
Propositon 1: Central banks with lower (higher) credibility degrees are constrained (improved) by 
inflationary dynamics which is more (less) sensible to the past inflation levels, that is, in such a case there is 
more (less) inertia in the inflationary process.   
The central bank’ credibility depends on its commitment to the announced target, given the assumption 
according to which this target is compatible with the economic structure (the structural model). This 
commitment, in its turn, is perceived by the public if the target is attained periodically and/or the instrument 
policy adjustments are regarded as consistent in the face of policy goal.  
Hence, in order to gain credibility, some degree of rigidity or inflexibility for the monetary policy is 
necessary, at least initially while the last one is seen as non-credible (King, 1996). As long as the credibility is 
not consolidated, the central bank should avoid deviations from its target, at least in order to decrease the 
necessary time in building reputation and credibility. Under low credibility, the public translates small 
deviations as a lack of commitment, or as wrong target announcements, or even as inadequate adjustments of 
interest rates. In such a context, the expected inflation diverges from the inflation target, making the last one 
more difficult to be attained, even if the central bank really has implicit commitment to the announced goal.  
Obviously, the deviations from the target can be justified under specific situations, given their social 
benefit/cost ratio. However, the specific situation should be transitory. Hence, although some deviations are 
justifiable, they should be constrained through the time, if the monetary authority looks for maximizing the 
credibility. As it will be shown formally, the higher the credibility, the lower the weight on the past inflation 
rates in the expected inflationary process (there will be more weight on the announced target), and the lower 
the sensibility of the credibility level to the observed deviations. It means that the credibility process is 
endogenous to the past inflation outcomes and has a kind of nonlinear sensibility to the observed economic 
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deviations, in line with the works of Argov et al. (2007) and Alich et al. (2009). In such an economy, the 
central bank receives power to be more flexible in managing interest rates, given that new divergences 
between the inflation rate and the inflation target do not have significant impacts on the inflation expectations, 
and the credibility level is not affected as a consequence of the lower sensibility of the last one to the observed 
inflation deviations.  
The flexibility is the yield a central bank earns by consolidating credibility in higher levels. However, 
while the monetary authority has low credibility degree, the flexibility is not so reasonable, given that any 
small inflation deviation and output gap can create expected inflation deviations, inflation inertia and new 
credibility lossesc, as a consequence of the higher sensibility of the credibility to the observed deviations. The 
credibility versus flexibility dilemma could be also illustrated by means of the trade-off between inflation and 
output variances, in the case of supply shocks. There is an exchange through time between inflation variability 
and output variability, when central banks are setting off inflationary processes that have been originated by 
supply shocks (for example, an increase in commodity and energy prices) (Svensson, 1997; Ball, 1999). In 
such a context, pushing down inflation deviation imposes necessarily higher output gaps.  
If monetary authority raises real interest rate in order to decrease inflation, output will present reduction, 
by staying below its potential level. Hence, under supply shocks, it is commonly accepted some degree of 
inflation accommodation as a means of avoiding output losses (Svensson, 1997; Clarida, Galí & Gertler, 
1999). However, with low credibility levels, inflation accommodation can have significant impacts on the 
expected inflation, on the inflationary dynamics through inertia components and on the credibility levels.  
Proposition 2: When central banks have low (high) credibility degree, its power to accommodate supply 
shocks, and maintain employment levels, is constrained (improved).  
On the other hand, the higher the central bank’s credibility levels, the higher the flexibility power to 
accommodate inflation and to concern with real variables under supply shocks. In the same way, central banks 
with high credibility degree have power to adjust interest rates for stimulating economic activity, without 
generating economic instability, as expected inflation is strongly anchored on inflation target and credibility 
degree is not so sensible to observed gapsd. Therefore, taking into account this endogeneity and nonlinear 
nature of the central bank’s credibility, what should we expect in terms of real variables trajectories when 
different qualities (e.g. different credibility degrees) of monetary policy regimes are facing interest rate 
shocks?  
3. The endogenous and nonlinear credibility degree model 
A credibility index and its endogenous and nonlinear dynamics 
 
In line with Argov et al. (2007), the following small-scale structural macro model does not present explicit 
microfoundations, but it resembles New-Keynesian models, such as in Ball (1999), Svensson (1997) and 
Clarida, Galí & Gertler (1999), thereby becoming useful in analyzing monetary policy implementation and 
dynamic macro responses from different kind of shocks, specifically interest rate shocks in this paper. The 
key difference between the following model and the standard New-Keynesian models is in the central bank’s 
endogenous and nonlinear credibility, which will be proposed.  
Let the credibility degree be expressed by: 
 
 
c In other words, lack of credibility raises the weight of past observed inflation (backward component) on the expected inflation and 
the output-inflation trade-off (Argov et al., 2007).      
d The conventional literature on credibility sees a positive correlation between credibility levels and the weight on the announced 
target in the expected inflation function (See Argov et al., 2007; Lalonde, 2005).     
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Expression (1) says that credibility degree (C), under a general specification, is function of lagged 
adjustments of interest rates (R) vis-à-vis natural interest rate (RT)e, letting be rt = Rt – RT, ut a shock 
(random control error) with zero mean and constant variance, and n the relevant number of lags. Let natural 
rate be what make possible output equaling to potential output and inflation equaling to inflation target. In 
general, natural rate is understood as a real interest rate level that allows a non inflationary output growth. By 
(1), lower the real interest rate deviation from natural rate, higher the credibility through time.   
However, as public does not know precisely at what level the natural rate is, it is necessary to take into 
account relevant observable variables to infer about the monetary policy commitment. So, let credibility 
degree be: 
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By (2), under a general specification, the lower inflation and output deviations from their targets, the 
higher the credibility degree attained by the central bank. Now, in a particular specification and for analytical 
reason, so that credibility degree is ranging from 0 to 1, let the credibility determination process be: 
 
(3) Ct = 1, if St-1 is equal to zero, which is regarded as a special case, and: 
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, if S t-1 is different from zerof, which is regarded as a general case. 
 
Equation (4) makes credibility level approximating to 0, as inflation deviations increase in t-1 period, and 
approximating to 1 as deviations decrease in t-1. Moreover, credibility level depends on its past value (Ct-1) – 
an auto-regressive component –, given the positive inertial coefficient G. Now, let the expected inflation 
deviation be built by a process such as: 
 
(5) Et[St+1] = (1 – Ct-1)(S t-1) 
 
By (5), if credibility in t-1 period is maximum (C t-1 = 1), expected inflation deviation for t+1 period equals 
to zero, even if a positive or negative inflation deviation really happened in t-1 period. It means that, under C t-
1 = 1, inflation expectation is fully anchored on the inflation target. On the other hand, if C t-1 < 1 expected 
inflation deviation is partially or integrally (for C t-1 = 0) dependent on inflation deviation in t-1.     
In turn, someone can ask: does credibility degree have linear sensibility to inflation deviations? In other 
words, is D (in equation 4) fixed as C varies through time? If answer is yes, it means that, for all credibility 
 
 
e That is, real interest rate is Granger cause of credibility. 
f Equation (4) for simplicity does not consider the random control error. Moreover, equation 4 is more convenient, algebraically, 
under non explosive shocks.    
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levels, central bank’s credibility is affected in the same way by new inflation deviations. But, like suggested 
by King (1996), it is easy to think of a nonlinear relation between observable gaps and credibility variation, 
depending on the credibility level under consideration.  
Let’s assume that exist a critical credibility level, below which credibility degree becomes more sensible 
to observable deviations, that is, D is increased. This nonlinearity in D parameter contributes to impose a 
penalty on central banks with low credibility levels, augmenting the risks of new credibility losses; at the 
same time, the nonlinearity contributes to reward central banks with higher credibility levels, giving them 
more power to implement deliberated monetary policies.  
Let’s consider D the parameter value that is verified in period t if Ct-1 ≥ CT (a critical level); in turn, 
consider D the parameter value that is verified in period t if C t-1 < CT; and assume necessarily D< D. 
Formally in Table 1 below: 
 
Table 1 - Nonlinearity of the credibility level sensibility to observed gaps 
If Ct-1 ≥ CT → system has D in 
period t.
If Ct-1 < CT → system has D in 
period t.
Let additionally be  
D<D 
Source: Own elaboration. 
 
Hence, when the central bank presents high credibility in the previous period (Ct-1 ≥ CT), equation 4 in 
period t works through D value; it means credibility degree shows lower sensibility to observed gaps; but if 
central bank presents low credibility in the previous period (Ct-1 < CT), equation 4 in period t works through D 
value, credibility degree becoming more sensible to observed economic deviations.  
 
Economic activity, inflation rate and monetary policy rule 
 
The economic activity deviation is determined by an IS dynamic equation, such as:  
 
(6) yt = m(yt-1) - n(rt-1) + Kt 
 
The output gap (yt) depends on the lagged output gap (yt-1) and the lagged interest rate deviation (rt-1); 
there is a demand shock, K, a stochastic process with zero mean and fixed variance (white noise process); all 
the parameters, m and n, are positives. Additionally, let us consider the output gap as a deviation of the 
effective output (Yt) in relation to potential output (Yp): yt = Yt - Ytpg.  
In its turn, the inflation rate process is given through a Phillips dynamic equation: 
 
(7) St = Et[St+1@ Y(yt-1) + gt 
 
Equation (7) establishes that inflation rate deviation (St) is determined by inflation expectation for t+1 
period ((t>St+1@), by the lagged output gap (yt-1) and by the supply shock (gt), defined as a stochastic process 
with zero mean and fixed variance (white noise process); the parameters, W and Y, are positive. Here, inflation 
deviation means a divergence between inflation rate (3 t) and inflation target (3n). Hence, St = 3 t – 3n. 
 
 
 
g In the same way, let rt-1 be the deviation of the real interest rate (Rt-1) vis-à-vis the natural interest rate (Rn). 
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Substituting (4) and (5) in (7): 
 
(8) St = {1 –  [GCt-1 + (1 - G) ¸¸¹
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In equation 8 it is possible to verify the inverse correlation between the credibility degree in past period 
and the current inflation deviation. Finally, the monetary policy rule is described by: 
 
(9) rt = (U(z1 Stz2 yt) + (U)rt-1 + \t 
 
Hence, the current real interest rate deviation depends on inflation and output gaps and on the past interest 
rate deviations, given z1 and z2 are positive parameters, U is the inertial coefficient of the monetary policy and 
\t is the monetary policy’s innovation component or shock, with zero mean and constant variance.   
4. Methodology and results 
4.1. Methodology 
The methodology of simulating follows broadly Ball’s (1999) article and Walsh’s (2003) work. As said by 
the latter, “since we can vary the parameters of our theoretical models in ways we cannot vary the 
characteristics of real economies, simulation methods allow us to answer a variety of ‘what if’ questions” 
(Walsh, 2003, p. 67).   
The simulation strategy has the following step-by-step: 
i) From an expansionary monetary policy shock, it is simulated how the output gap would behave if 
credibility degree was constant through the time, under different credibility degree values (0.9; 0.5; 0.1), that 
is, in such cases, C is a constant in equation 5; 
ii) From an expansionary monetary policy shock, it is simulated how the output gap behaves when the 
credibility degree varies with the inflation deviations, starting from 0.1 (C0 = 0.1), 0.5 (C0 = 0.5) and 0.9 (C0 = 
0.9), and this sensibility also changes according to the modifications in the credibility degree, that is, all the 
equations hold integrally. The Table 2 below presents the parameter values used in the simulations: 
 
Table 2 – Parameter values for the simulations 
G D M z1 N Y U z2 
0.8 0.2 or 0.9 0.8 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.5 0.6 
(*) D = 0.2, if Ct-1 ≥ 0.5; and D = 0.9, if C t-1 < 0.5. Source: Own elaboration. 
 
4.2. Results 
Initially, the Graph 1 shows how the output gap behaves from an expansionary monetary policy shock, 
under three different regimes, which impose constant credibility degrees for the central bank. The regime with 
the credibility degree equal to 0.1 is the more unstable, in comparison with both the regimes that present 
credibility degrees equal to 0.5 and to 0.9. Therefore, the higher the credibility degree, the higher the 
flexibility for the central bank to stimulate the economy, as interest rate fluctuations do not cause significant 
economic instability. In such cases, however, the observed gaps do not imply changes in the credibility degree 
293 Ricardo Ramalhete Moreira /  Procedia Economics and Finance  1 ( 2012 )  286 – 295 
 
along the time, and, as a consequence, the inflation expectations have constant sensibility to the past inflation 
deviations. Endogeneity and nonlinearity do not exist in the credibility determination process.  
On the other hand, what would occur with the output gap dynamics if those endogeneity and nonlinearity 
were verified? The Graph 2 presents the different output dynamics under: i) a regime in which the credibility 
degree is endogenous and its sensibility to the observed gaps is nonlinear (Endogenous and Nonlinear Regime 
– ENR 0.1), thereby initiating from C0 = 0.1; ii) a regime in which the credibility degree is endogenous and its 
sensibility to the observed gaps is nonlinear (ENR 0.5), thereby initiating from C0 = 0.5; iii) a regime in which 
the credibility degree is endogenous and its sensibility to the observed gaps is nonlinear (ENR 0.9), thereby 
initiating from C0 = 0.9. 
  As it was simulated, all the ENRs are subjected to the economic fluctuations as an effect  of monetary 
policy shocks, but the ENR (0.9) – i.e. the endogenous and nonlinear regime that has the higher initial 
credibility degree – has the lower volatility in the output gap trajectory.  
In its turn, the ENR (0.1) – i.e. the endogenous and nonlinear regime that has the lower initial credibility 
degree – has the higher volatility in the output deviations along the time. Hence, the central bank under ENR 
(0.9) has more flexibility to impose monetary policy shocks on the economy, with lower costs, basically 
because the output and inflation deviations do not create expressive non-alignment in the inflation 
expectations, which are initially more anchored in the inflation target than in the cases of ENR (0.5) and ENR 
(0.1). Therefore, the ENR (0.9) makes the credibility degree less sensible to the past inflation deviations than 
what occurs under the ENR (0.5) and the ENR (0.1).   
 
 
 
 
 
Graph 1 – Output gap’s trajectory with different constant credibility degrees (0.1;0.5;0.9) 
 
Source: own elaboration. 
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Graph 2 – Output gap’s trajectory with Endogenous and Nonlinear Regimes (ENR) 
 
Source: own elaboration. 
 
The Graph 3, in its turn, presents together all the regimes that have been simulated and put into the 
Graphs 1 and 2. 
 
Graph 3 – Output gap’s trajectory with constant credibility degrees and with Endogenous and 
Nonlinear Regimes (ENR) 
 
Source: own elaboration. 
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Bank’s credibility cannot be considered as a constant in the real world; by the contrary, it is affected by the 
observed gaps and deviations, thereby influencing the agents’ expectations and the monetary policy 
efficiency. 
The ENR (0.9) has higher volatility in the output dynamics, in comparison with the constant credibility 
regime C = 0.9. It is verified because in the first one there is a credibility change process, as the monetary 
policy impulse is followed by output and inflation responses. At the first moment, the monetary policy 
impulse and the inflation rate responses cause a credibility degree loss, so that the output dynamics is more 
volatile under the ENR (0.9) than under the constant credibility regime C = 0.9.      
The same finding occur if the ENR (0.1) is compared with the constant credibility regime C = 0.1, and if 
the ENR (0.5) is compared with the constant credibility regime C = 0.5. Therefore, the credibility degree 
losses (or gains), as a consequence of changes in the inflation rate, make the Endogenous and Nonlinear 
Regimes (0.1; 0.5; 0.9) more volatile than their respective constant credibility cases (C = 0.1; C = 0.5; C = 
0.9).    
5. Concluding remarks 
Even if the countries are faced with the same kind of shocks and if they are also under the same type of 
policy regime, it is possible to verify differences in the economic dynamics among them. This work exploits 
some sources for these differences, which are basically related to the practice of central banking: 
a) Central banks with lower (higher) credibility degree are constrained (improved) by inflationary 
dynamics which is more (less) sensible to the past inflation levels, that is, in such a case there is more (less) 
inertia in the inflationary process;   
b) When central banks have low (high) credibility degree, its power to accommodate supply shocks or to 
stimulate output, and maintain or increase employment level, is constrained (improved);  
c) The initial credibility degree is an important factor in determining economic variables dynamics. It 
means that the Central Banks’ historic performance explains at least part of the differences of economic 
cycles that are observed in their respective economies.  
References 
Alich, A. - Chen, H. - Clinton, K. (2009),  ‘Inflation Targeting under Imperfect Policy Credibility’, IMF Working Paper 09/94. 
International Monetary Fund. 
Argov, E. - Epstein, N. – Karam , P. (2007), ‘Endogenous Monetary Policy Credibility in a Small Macro Model of Israel’,  IMF Working 
Paper 07/207. International Monetary Fund. 
Ball, L. (1999), ‘Efficient rules for monetary policy’,  International Finance, v. 2, n. 1 :63-83. 
Ball, L. (2002), ‘Policy Rules and External Shocks’, in Norman Loayza and Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel, Monetary Policy: Rules and 
Transmission Mechanisms, Banco Central de Chile.  
Clarida, R - J. Galí - M. Gertler. (1999), ‘The science of monetary policy:  a new Keynesian perspective’,  Journal of Economic 
Literature, v. XXXVII: 1661-1707.  
Galí, J. - Gertler, M. (2007), ‘Macroeconomic Modeling for Monetary Policy Evaluation’,  Journal of Economic Perspectives, 21:25-45. 
King, M. (1996), ‘How should central banks reduce inflation? Conceptual issues’,  FED of Kansas City Economic Review, fourth quarter. 
Lalonde, R. (2005), ‘Endogenous Central Bank Credibility in a Small Forward Looking Model of the U.S. Economy’,  Bank of Canada, 
Working Paper n. 2005-06.  
Sicsú, J.  (2001), ‘Credible monetary policy: a post Keynesian approach’,  Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, Summer 2001, vol. 23, 
No. 4 
Svensson, L. (1997),  ‘Inflation forecast targeting: implementing and monitoring inflation targets’,  European Economic Review, 41: 
1111-1146.  
Walsh, C. E. (2003). “Monetary Theory and Policy”.  The MIT Press, 2nd ed.  
 
 
